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TIPPING THE SCALES: COURTS STRUGGLE TO
STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS TORT AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last one hundred years, courts have struggled to
reconcile the competing interests of an individual's right to
vindicate personal privacy' via the public disclosure of private
facts tort2 and the press's First Amendment' right to publish
truthful information.4 This constitutional clash has grown
both in severity and frequency' over the last few decades6 as
1. There is no fixed definition for the right of privacy. Some scholars argue
that the right of privacy is the right to be let alone. Others argue that the right
of privacy is "the freedom of the individual to pick and choose for himself the
time and circumstances under which, and most importantly, the extent to
which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and opinions are to be shared with or
withheld from others." Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Orville G. Brim, Privacy and
Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1965).
2. Some states have recognized a right to privacy as a derivative of the
common law. Other states have recognized a statutory right of privacy. Some
states such as California have recognized both a common law and statutory
right of privacy. Other states such as Texas, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island have recognized neither a common law claim of privacy nor a
statutory right of privacy.
3. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. The public disclosure of private facts tort forces courts to engage in the
difficult task of balancing the First Amendment's protection of freedom of the
press and the interest of the states in protecting the privacy of individuals. On
the one hand, there is the plaintiffs right to privacy. This is a right that is
becoming increasingly more susceptible to invasion and that should probably be
given extended protection. On the other hand, there is the public's right to have
information that will assist it in coping with the exigencies of the times.
Indeed, one of the predominant purposes of the First Amendment is to foster an
informed and enlightened public opinion through preservation of an
untrammeled press. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
5. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
151-52 (1995).
Media coverage once focused on a small group of very famous people,
while average Americans watched from the sidelines. But in recent
years the "information age" has burst into the information
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more and more citizens have grown intolerant of media
publishers who consistently sacrifice individual privacy rights
for commercial profits.7  Statistics have shown that the
American public has become increasingly disenchanted with
the media's persistent stretching of the First Amendment
over the last few decades.8 But perhaps what is even more
indicative of the extent to which the press has tread upon
personal privacy rights is the fact that journalists from within
the media profession have been calling for changes in
journalistic ethics and professionalism for quite some time.9
explosion .... As a consequence, people who in another time would
have lived their lives in quiet obscurity now find themselves in the
spotlight.
Id. "America is in the midst of an explosion of litigation aimed against the
media. Americans who feel that their reputations have been impugned or their
privacy invaded by the broadcast or print media have increasingly resorted to
litigation for vindication." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 4-5 (1986).
6. During the 1960s, the Supreme Court set the stage for a collision of
constitutional dimension. At roughly the same time the Court broadened
protection for false speech in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), the Court also expressed an interest in protecting individual privacy, in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. One of the more striking examples of the media's overzealous prying
into private matters was Princess Diana's death in August of 1997. Hounded
for most of her adult life by a crazed press that mercilessly pried into her
private affairs, Diana ultimately died as a result of the press's onslaught.
Ironically, one week before Diana's death, TIME magazine ran a lead story in its
publication focusing on the fleeting right of privacy within the United States.
The author stated
[flor the longest time, I couldn't get worked up about privacy: my right
to it; how its dying; how we're headed for an even more wired, under-
regulated, over-intrusive, privacy deprived planet... [but] it struck me
that our privacy-mine and yours-has already disappeared, not in one
Big Brotherly Blitzkrieg but in Little Brotherly moments, bit by bit....
We need new legal protections.
Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 30-32.
8. According to a national survey conducted in December 1996 by the
Center of Media and Public Affairs, a nonprofit research organization, 52% of
Americans said they believe the news media abuses the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of the press. Substantial numbers in the survey also
described journalists as arrogant and cynical. See Professional Soul-Searching
Proposed by Journalists, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 6, 1997, at A8. "Today, perhaps
more than ever, Americans just don't trust the press. . . . Seven in ten
Americans [ I believe that the nation's most influential papers are biased. And
this statistical portrait reveals only part of the national mood." Public Opinion
Poll; the Media on Trial, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1984.
9. Alarmed by the troubled state of the journalism profession, a group of
prominent journalists has called for a major re-examination of what they do,
how they do it, and why. Chaired by Bill Kovach of the Nieman Foundation, the
Committee of Concerned Journalists has scheduled a series of eight forums to
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Generally, despite increasing public disenchantment with
the tactics and coverage of the media, courts have often
struck the balance of constitutional rights in favor of the right
to publish. ° In large part, this has occurred because of a
broad judicial reading of the First Amendment's scope of
protection for free speech." As a result, the common law
address subjects including the purpose of journalism, its role as a neutral
observer, and its preoccupation with crime and scandal. According to Tom
Rosenstiel, Vice Chairman of the Committee:
If you were going to say what prompts an effort like this, it's not only
that the public is increasingly angry that we have a breach of faith
with the public, but in a sense this is a group of very prominent
journalists saying "We agree, we share many of the concerns of the
public about what we're doing."
Professional Soul-Searching Proposed by Journalists, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 6, 1997,
at A8.
10. This area of the law is especially troublesome for courts because they
are asked to impose liability upon defendants that publish accurate and truthful
information. Unlike the law of defamation, where the press is sanctioned for
the publication of false information that clearly falls outside the scope of the
First Amendment, public disclosure of private facts tort cases force courts to
distinguish between those truthful publications that are protected by the First
Amendment and those that are not. See Clark v. American Broad. Co., 684 F.2d
1208 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding defendant liable for the use of video footage
showing plaintiff walking down a public street in a documentary about
prostitution because the image implied the woman was in fact a prostitute);
Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that a false
publication identifying the plaintiff as a member of the Communist party was
defamatory); Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 629 A.2d 601 (Me. 1993)
(holding that false accusations within a company that a fellow employee
sabotaged a company computer are defamatory).
Many scholars have debated whether the public disclosure of private facts
tort creates a new legal right at all, or whether it merely presents a duplicate
tort of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. For example, a
critical commentator, has labeled it a "phantom tort [whose] cases present facts
dangerously near the edge of triviality based on an evil that judges believe is
largely mythical." Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362
(1983). However, other scholars have characterized "the sensational exposure of
the intimate details of a private life in the mass media as a deeply intrusive
impairment of the intimacy and inner space necessary to individuality and
human dignity." Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The
Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 53 (1974).
11. See generally discussion infra Part II. As the Supreme Court of the
United States has emphasized, the First Amendment ensures that debate on
public issues will remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). However, there are numerous
conflicting theories as to what the purpose and scope of the First Amendment
should be. The following summary by Professor Thomas Emerson is considered
one of the leading explications of the scope and role of the First Amendment in
our democratic system: (1) assurance of individual self-fulfillment; (2)
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public disclosure tort has yet to evolve into a potent legal
doctrine that serves as a substantial check on the unfettered
discretion of the press. 12 Rather, most courts have limited the
public disclosure tort's applicability to egregious situations
where an actionable invasion of privacy is readily apparent.
However, at the same time that courts have been
reluctant to expand the public disclosure tort, legislatures
have begun to recognize that privacy rights warrant
protection. For example, the California Legislature recently
enacted California Civil Code section 1708.8 to limit intrusive
newsgathering by the press that trammels upon privacy
rights. 3  This statutory enactment demonstrates that
intrusive media coverage is recognized as a societal problem.
Moreover, this statute expressly states that this "section shall
not be construed to limit all other rights or remedies of
plaintiffis] in law or equity, including, but not limited to, the
publication of private facts."14  This signifies that the
California Legislature believes that the public disclosure tort
is an important common law cause of action that should
provide aggrieved plaintiffs with compensatory damages.
But, at what point does the press cross the line between a
legitimate publication and an actionable invasion of a
person's privacy?
This comment traces the history of the public disclosure
of private facts tort 5 and describes the approaches taken by
courts to strike a balance between an individual's right to
recover damages for the publication of truthful, but private,
facts" and the media's First Amendment right of free press."
advancement of knowledge and the discovery of truth; (3) facilitation of
participation in the political process; and (4) maintenance of the appropriate
balance between stability and change. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1, 6 (1970).
12. One of the biggest obstacles facing a public disclosure of private facts
plaintiff is the fact that many of these cases are resolved on summary judgment.
Rather than allowing the law in this area to expand via the case law, all too
often, speech protective judges rule as a matter of law and dismiss cases before
a jury can evaluate the merits of a claim.
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 1999). In addition to this recent statute,
the California Legislature has also recognized the need to protect an
individual's right of publicity. This right protects an individual from the
unauthorized use of the individual's name or likeness for commercial purposes.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1971).
14. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1708.8(e) (West 1999).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. A common law right of privacy is now recognized in the majority of
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Courts should distinguish between the level of First
Amendment protection afforded matters of general political or
judicial concern and those matters related solely to private
aspects of people's lives. 8 Furthermore, courts should seldom
grant summary judgment motions in these cases. Instead,
the jury, as the voice of the community, should decide
whether the press is impermissibly intruding into ostensibly
private affairs. Finally, this comment proposes several
factors that courts should consider when determining
whether a publication is truly newsworthy or merely an
unjustified intrusion into private matters. This comment
concludes that the proper way to resolve these tough legal
issues is through a totality of the circumstances ad hoc
balancing test applied by the jury rather than through
judicial application of bright line standards that overestimate
the chances free speech will be chilled by imposing tort
liability.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of the Right of Privacy
The theory that privacy should be a legally protected
right was first articulated in an 1890 law review article
written by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren. 9 The
article, which was a reaction to the editorial practices of
Boston newspapers, stated:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to
the next step which must be taken for the protection of the
person, and for securing to the individual what Judge
Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.' Instantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
jurisdictions in the United States. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239
(N.H. 1964); Apodac v. Miller, 441 P.2d. 200 (N.M. 1968); Fergerstrom v.
Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141 (Haw. 1968); Rugg v. McCarty, 476
P.2d 753 (Colo. 1970); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
17. This comment presents an extensive background section, which
examines the leading California and United States Supreme Court public
disclosure of private facts cases. This section contains lengthy factual accounts
and a detailed description of the courts' holdings because this is an especially
fact-specific area of the law where cases are often narrowly decided on their own
discrete facts. See infra Part II.B-E.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
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sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.' Of the desirability
"indeed the necessity 'of some such protection, there can, it
is believed, be no doubt. The press is overstepping in
every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of
the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste
the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent,
column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can
only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.2°
In articulating their privacy theory, Brandeis and
Warren expressed their belief that the common law is flexible
enough to meet the changing needs of society without the
necessity of legislative intervention.2 They argued that the
common law should afford an injured citizen a right to
recover damages from publishers who intrude into the
domestic circle and write articles about the "private life,
habits, acts, and relations of [ ] individuals [which have] no
legitimate connection with [a person's] fitness for a public
office... and [which have] no legitimate relation to or any
bearing upon any act done by him in a public or quasi public
capacity."" The authors conceded that the right of privacy is
not absolute and must yield to the public's right to know in
certain circumstances." They felt information regarding an
individual's fitness for office or other information relevant to
20. Id. at 196.
21. Id. at 194.
22. Id. at 215.
23. Id. at 214. Warren and Brandies acknowledged that the right of privacy
is a limited right that must be balanced in light of other constitutional rights.
In articulating their privacy theory, the authors noted the following:
(1) The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any
matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is made
under circumstances which would render the it a privileged
communication according to the law of slander and libel .... (2) The
law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by
oral publication in the absence of special damage. (3) The right to
privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or
with his consent .... (4) The truth of the matter published does not
afford a defen[s]e. . . . (5) The absence of "malice" in the publisher does
not afford a defen[sle.
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a person's public or quasi-public activities does not create an
actionable violation of a person's privacy rights.24
Twelve years after Warren and Brandies's law review
article, the theory of invasion of privacy was rejected by the
first court to consider it in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.2" In Roberson, the defendant flour company, obtained a
good likeness of the plaintiff and reproduced it on their
advertising posters.26 Despite the plaintiffs claim that she
felt humiliated and suffered great distress, the court, in a
four to three opinion, rejected a common law privacy action."
Among the reasons articulated by the court for its opinion
were: 1) concerns about innovating the law after so many
centuries; 2) an inability to see how the doctrine would work;
and 3) if accepted, how it could be properly limited to prevent
windfalls to those who both enjoyed the publicity, yet still
wanted to collect damages for it. 8 Although the court
discussed Warren and Brandeis' article at length, it concluded
that the precedents relied upon were too remote to sustain
the proposed right.29
Immediate public outcry followed the Roberson decision
as a disenchanted public clamored for protection of individual
privacy rights. Shortly thereafter, the New York Legislature
responded by creating a very narrow statutory right of
privacy.0  Although this statute merely prohibited the
appropriation of a person's identity for trade or advertising
purposes,1 it legitimized Warren and Brandeis's notion that
each individual has a right to privacy. This statute not only
24. Among the recognized matters of legitimate societal concern that the
press could publish with impunity were activities occurring in courts of law,
legislative bodies, municipal assemblies, and practically any other
communications made in a public body, or in any quasi-public capacity. Id.
25. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
26. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 444.
29. Id. at 449.
30. This provision states:
A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a
minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS § 50 (1902). This statute is much like CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 3344, which also protects against the unauthorized use of a person's
name or likeness for commercial purposes.
31. Id.
1999] 1223
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legitimized the right of privacy in New York, but also
provided persuasive justification for other states to develop
their own privacy laws.
Three years after Roberson, the Supreme Court of
Georgia faced a similar fact situation in Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co. 2 In this case, the defendant
insurance company utilized the plaintiffs name and picture
in its advertisements for life insurance without obtaining the
plaintiffs consent." In analyzing the plaintiffs claim for
invasion of privacy, the court traced the history of privacy
back to the natural rights of man34 and Roman law.35 The
court also stated that a right to privacy based upon a
supposed right of property, or a breach of trust or confidence,
had been recognized in both England and the common law of
the United States.36 Conceding that a right of privacy
independent of property or contract rights had yet to be
recognized,37 the court nonetheless stated that the novelty of
the claim did not prevent the common law from affording a
remedy.38 The court scrutinized the constitutional right to
liberty39 and held that it was broad enough to encompass a
right to privacy." Consequently, the court rejected the
conclusion in Roberson4 and held that a common law cause of
action for invasion of privacy could be maintained.4"
In defining the scope of the right to privacy, the Pavesich
32. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
33. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905).
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 69.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 70.
39. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905).
40. Id. at 70. In construing the right to liberty, the court stated:
When the law guarantees to one the right to the enjoyment of his life, it
gives to him something more than the mere right to breathe and
exist.... Each person has a liberty of privacy, and every other person
has, as against him, liberty in reference to other matters, and the line
where these liberties impinge upon each other may be hard to define;
but that such a case may arise can afford no more reason for denying to
one his liberty of privacy than it would to deny to another his liberty,
whatever it may be.
Id. at 70-72.
41. Id. at 77. The court in Pavesich was unwilling to accept the Roberson
conclusion that a right of privacy could not legitimately be inferred from the
common law and the commentaries of legal scholars. Id.
42. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 78.
1224 [Vol. 39
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court discussed the implications of living in a civilized
society. 3 Although the court acknowledged the existence of a
common law right of privacy, it maintained that this right is
not absolute." The court ruled that the right to free speech
could, at times, outweigh the individual's interest in privacy.
45
In holding that the plaintiff established a valid claim for
invasion of privacy, the court emphasized that the competing
interests of free press and privacy must be balanced so that
neither right is abused to the detriment of the other.46
Following the decision in Pavesich, numerous courts
throughout the country began to consider whether a common
law cause of action for invasion of privacy could be
maintained. Although, Pavesich dealt specifically with the
unauthorized use of a person's identity, the court's dicta
expressed approval of the tort theory that public disclosure of
private facts could be recognized as an actionable invasion of
privacy.47 However, it was not until the 1931 California case
of Melvin v. Reid," that the public disclosure of private facts
tort gained serious acceptance. 9
43. Id. at 69.
44. Id.
45. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905). The
court stated:
[So long as the truth is adhered to, the right of privacy of another
cannot be said to have been invaded by one who speaks or writes or
prints, provided the reference to such person, and the manner in which
he is referred to, is reasonably and legitimately proper in an expression
of opinion on a subject that is under investigation. It will therefore be
seen that the right of privacy must in some particulars yield to the
right of speech and of the press.
Id. at 74-75.
46. Id. The court stated that the key considerations in evaluating the scope
of First Amendment protection for publications were: 1) whether the subject
matter of the publication was of legitimate public concern and 2) whether the
publication of such a matter was reasonable. Id. The court held that there
might be cases where the speaking or printing of the truth might be considered
an abuse of the liberty of speech and of the press,
as in a case where matters of purely private concern, wholly foreign to
a legitimate expression of opinion on the subject under discussion, are
injected into the discussion, for no other purpose and with no other
motive than to annoy and harass the individual referred to .... [Ihf
such should arise, the party aggrieved may not be without a remedy.
Id. at 74.
47. Id.
48. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
49. This comment is limited mainly to a discussion of the evolution of the
public disclosure of private facts tort as it has developed in California and as it
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
B. Development of the Right to Privacy in California
In Melvin, the California court of appeal considered
whether the plaintiff, a reformed prostitute," could recover
damages based upon the defendant's production of a motion
picture that utilized her true maiden name when
documenting her acquittal at a murder trial thirteen years
earlier.5 As a result of the film, the plaintiff claimed she was
scorned and abandoned by those who did not know of her past
and endured grievous mental and physical suffering.52
In evaluating the merits of the case, the Melvin court
stated that the law of privacy is recent in origin,53 varies fromjurisdiction to jurisdiction,54 and presents a novel question of
law in California.55 In analyzing what privacy means and
whether California would recognize such a right, the court
stated that privacy has generally been defined as the "right to
live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to
unwarranted and undesired publicity. In short, it is the right
to be let alone."6 However, the court added, despite the fact
that an individual may desire to remain in obscurity and
avoid having his life exposed to the public gaze, the right to
privacy is not absolute.57 The court explained that there
might be times when an individual becomes involved in an
activity or occurrence of public or general interest that
justifies publicity, regardless of the individual's desire to
remain anonymous.5"
Applying this standard, the court held that the use of the
incidents of the plaintiffs life relating to the murders was not
an actionable invasion of privacy because they were recorded
has been considered by the United States Supreme Court. Because other states
have experienced a parallel development in their respective common law,
California precedent is valuable in understanding the emergence of this tort.
50. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
51. Id. The plaintiff abandoned her former life of prostitution thirteen years
earlier and became entirely rehabilitated. She married, and began caring for
her home, and thereafter assumed a place in respectable society and made




55. Id. at 92.
56. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
57. Id. at 92-93.
58. Id. at 93.
1226 [Vol. 39
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in public records that were available for public inspection. 9
The court stated that "the very fact that they were contained
in a public record is sufficient to negative the idea that their
publication was a violation of the right of privacy.""
However, the court reached a different conclusion on the issue
of the use of the plaintiffs name in the film."1 In holding that
disclosure of the plaintiffs true maiden name was a violation
of her privacy rights, the court relied upon the language of
the California Constitution, which states: "[all men are by
nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property;
and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."62 The
court construed the language granting the right to pursue
and obtain happiness as broad enough to encompass a right of
privacy that protects individuals from unwarranted attacks
upon one's liberty, property, and reputation." In addition,
the court cited policy considerations such as the rehabilitation
of criminals as further justification for sustaining the
plaintiffs cause of action.64
Most significant to the court's analysis was its use of a
moral and ethical standard by which it evaluated the
publication. The court found that the publication
was not justified by any standard of morals or ethics




62. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (quoting CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1). It is important to note that this language was excerpted from the
California Constitution as it existed in 1931. The California Constitution was
later amended in 1974 to expressly include the right of privacy as an inalienable
right. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
63. Melvin, 297 P. at 93.
The use of the appellant's true name in connection with the incidents of
her former life ... was unnecessary and indelicate, and a willful and
wanton disregard of that charity which should actuate us in our social
intercourse, and which should keep us from unnecessarily holding
another up to the scorn and contempt of upright members of society.
Id.
64. Id. The court's reliance on policy considerations to determine whether
the plaintiffs privacy had been invaded established that policy would be an
important factor in future privacy cases. This is significant because it shows
that public disclosure of private facts cases turn on the balancing of numerous
factors.
1999] 1227
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plaintiffs] inalienable right .... Whether we call this a
right of privacy or give it another name is immaterial,
because it is a right guaranteed by our Constitution that
must not be ruthlessly and needlessly invaded by others.65
Although the holding in Melvin was not universally followed,
it became the leading opinion on the public disclosure of
private facts tort throughout the majority of jurisdictions.66
C. The Struggle to Define the Elements and Scope of the Tort
After Melvin, California courts struggled to strike the
appropriate balance between individual privacy rights and
the freedom of the press. Although Melvin established that
a right to privacy exists,68 the exact contours of this right were
far from certain. Instead of utilizing a bright line test or
enunciating hard and fast rules, the Melvin court relied on an
ad hoc judicial approach to resolve the issue.69 As a result,
subsequent courts were free to create their own judicial tests
to determine when the press violated individual privacy
rights. °
Although there were a few minor cases in the years
65. Id. It is also important to note that the court felt compelled to evaluate
the morality of the publication's content. Rather than relying solely on legal
analysis and policy considerations, the court also relied upon a basic notions of
fairness and societal decency to reach its conclusion. This indicates that
community values are an extremely important consideration when determining
how to strike the balance between the press's right to publish and the
individual's right to privacy.
66. See generally ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 155. The public
disclosure of private facts tort is not recognized in all jurisdictions. Some states
have refused to recognize an individual's right to keep certain information
private. Many of these states have cited a lack of precedent, the purely mental
character of the injury, a fear of a flood of litigation, and the difficulty of
drawing a line between private and public figures as justifications for not
recognizing the public disclosure of private facts tort. In addition, these states
have also relied on the broad scope of the First Amendment as further
justification for denying their citizens a privacy cause of action. Often, states
that do not recognize the tort rely on language of the United States Supreme
Court, which indicates that "[tihe freedom of speech and of the press, which are
secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all
persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a State."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1967).
67. See infra Part II.C-E.
68. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
69. Id.
70. See infra Part II.C.
1228 [Vol. 39
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following the Melvin decision,7 the law did not begin to take
shape until the 1952 case of Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.' In
Gill, the defendant published an article discussing the
difference between love based upon "affection and respect"
and love based exclusively upon "sex attraction."73  To
illustrate this dichotomy, the defendant snapped a photo of
the plaintiffs while engaged in an affectionate pose and used
the photo as an example of the "wrong" kind of love. 4 As a
result, the plaintiffs, a married couple running an ice-cream
store, lost $200,000 in business and suffered great emotional
distress. 5
In reversing the lower court's demurrer, the Gill court
held that the plaintiffs had set forth a sufficient claim under
the public disclosure tort.76 Much like the court in Melvin,
which concluded that it was unnecessary for the press to
include the plaintiffs true maiden name, the Gill court
concluded that the inclusion of the plaintiffs' actual likeness
in the photo was unnecessary.77 In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted the importance of balancing the privacy rights
of individuals against the press's right to publish:
The right of privacy does undoubtedly infringe upon
absolute freedom of speech and of the press, and it also
clashes with the interest of the public in having a free
dissemination of news and information. These paramount
public interests must be taken into account in placing the
necessary limitations on the right of privacy. But if this
71. See Metter v. Los Angeles Exam'r., 95 P.2d 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939)
(holding news value of name and picture of a suicide victim who jumped from
downtown building outweighed husband's privacy claim); see also Kerby v. Hal
Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (holding publicity unjustified
for an actress's signing of a questionable letter); cf. Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (holding legitimacy of publication turned on the legitimacy
of the public's interest in a prize fighter).
72. 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
73. Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co. 239 P.2d 630, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 634-35.
77. Id. at 634. The court felt that the inclusion of the photograph did not
contribute significantly to the content of the defendant's article. "The article, to
fulfill its purpose and satisfy the public interest, if any, in the subject matter
discussed, could, possibly, stand alone without any picture." Id. This language
is significant because it demonstrates that the court was willing to look at the
necessity of including the private facts, rather than merely deferring to the
publisher's decision to include it.
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right of the individual is not without qualifications,
neither is freedom of speech and of the press unlimited.
The later privilege is subject to the qualification that it
shall not be so exercised as to abuse the rights of
individuals.... [Tihe constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press do not warrant the
publication of matter constituting an invasion of the right
of privacy any more than they give the right to defame a
78person.
The court concluded that it was necessary to balance the
competing interests involved and enunciated the following
standard by which to evaluate public disclosure cases:
The difficulty in defining the boundaries of the right, as
applied in the publication field, is inherent in the
necessity of balancing the public interest in the
dissemination of news, information and education against
the individual's interest in peace of mind and freedom
from emotional disturbances .... Factors deserving
consideration may include the medium of publication, the
extent of the use, the public interest served by the
publication, and the seriousness of the interference with
the person's privacy .... [Lliability exists only if the
defendant's conduct was such that he should have realized
that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary
sensibilities. It is only where the intrusion has gone
beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues .... If
the test is [ ] what an ordinary man would consider such,
then it is a question for the trier of fact rather than one of
law. 9
Thus, the Gill court appeared to create a judicial balancing
test that accounted for the necessity of the published matter,
the public's legitimate interest in that matter, the
offensiveness of the publication, and the social policies
implicated by the publication.
Nearly two decades after Gill, the California Supreme
Court addressed the difficult issue of striking the balance
between privacy rights and free speech in the case of Kapellas
v. Kofman. ° In Kapellas, the plaintiff, a candidate for the
local city council, brought a public disclosure of private facts
78. Id. at 633.
79. Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co. 239 P.2d 630, 634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)
(emphasis added).
80. 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
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suit on behalf of herself and her minor children against the
publisher of two local newspapers that published editorials
questioning her fitness for office.8' The articles questioned
the plaintiffs fitness by highlighting the fact that her
children had been involved in trouble with the law on
numerous occasions.82 The trial court granted the defendant's
demurrer on the claim and the Supreme Court affirmed.83
The Supreme Court explained that an individual's right
to privacy must be balanced against society's right to be
informed by the press of "newsworthy matters."84  In
determining which matters are constitutionally protected as
"newsworthy," the court explained that it considers "a variety
of factors, including the social value of the facts published,
the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private
affairs, and the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded
to a position of public notoriety."'" The court further
explained that information already in the public domain and
slight intrusions into private life are privileged even though
the social value of the published material may be minimal.86
Moreover, the court indicated that where the public interest
in published information is substantial, the press is allowed
greater leeway, especially if the individual assumed the risk
of voluntarily entering the public sphere.87 Thus, because the
plaintiff held herself out as a candidate for public office, the
defendant had a broad privilege to publish information that
related to her fitness for the position.8
Two years later, the California Supreme Court heard
another public disclosure of private facts case in Briscoe v.
81. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1969).
82. Id. at 914-15.
83. Id. at 914.
84. Id. at 922. "Sensitive to the privacy tort's potential encroachment on the
freedoms of speech and the press, our courts have recognized a broad privilege
cloaking the truthful publication of all newsworthy matters." Id.
85. Id. (citing on Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630 (1952)).
86. Id.
87. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969).
88. Id. at 919.
[The court noted that it would be] most reluctant to impede the free
flow of any truthful information that may be relevant to a candidate's
qualifications for office. Although the conduct of the candidate's
children in many cases may not appear particularly relevant to his
qualifications for office, normally the public should be permitted to
determine the importance or relevance of the reported facts for itself.
Id. at 923.
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Reader's Digest Assoc. 9 In Briscoe, the court considered
whether the trial court had properly granted a demurrer in
favor of the appellee, who had written an article about truck
hijackings that specifically named the appellant as a former
perpetrator, even though the event happened eleven years
earlier." Although the appellant conceded that the article
was newsworthy, the appellant argued that the use of his
actual name constituted an invasion of privacy.9'
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by
recognizing the legitimacy of the public disclosure of private
facts tort.92 The court then noted that the "central purpose of
the First Amendment is to give every voting member of the
body politic the fullest possible participation in the
understanding of those problems with which the citizens of a
self-governing society must deal."9 In addition, the court
explained that freedom of the press is not "confined to
comment upon public affairs and those persons that have
voluntarily sought the public spotlight."94 Nonetheless, the
court stated that not all factual accounts of current events are
privileged and that reports of public concern or interest are
most entitled to First Amendment protection. The court
unequivocally stated that truthful reports of current crimes
and the names of suspected perpetrators are privileged,
newsworthy matters under the First Amendment." However,
the court did not hold that disclosure of the names of former
89. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
90. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assoc. 483 P.2d 34, 34-35 (Cal. 1971).
91. Id. at 36.
92. The court stated that the "[a]cceptance of the right to privacy has grown
with the increasing capability of the mass media and electronic devices, with
their capacity to destroy an individual's anonymity, to intrude upon his most
intimate activities, and expose his most personal characteristics to public gaze."
Id. at 37.
93. Id. at 44 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PEOPLE 75 n.5 (1960).
94. Id. at 38.
95. Id. The court noted that almost any truthful commentary on public
officials or public affairs, no matter how serious the invasion of privacy, would
be privileged. Id.
96. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assoc. 483 P.2d 34, 39 (Cal. 1971). By
identifying those individuals who have been arrested for the commission of
crimes, the public interest is served by legitimately putting others on notice
that the named individual may be dangerous and by increasing the possibility
that witnesses will come forward to testify. Id.
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perpetrators is per se newsworthy.97
In reaching its conclusion, the court reaffirmed its
balancing approach to resolve the constitutional conflict
between the public disclosure tort and the First Amendment.
In addition, the court reaffirmed the Kapellas factors for
determining the newsworthiness of a publication. However,
despite acknowledging the role of policy in balancing privacy
rights against free speech rights,98 the court narrowed its
holding by stating that the balance is always weighed in favor
of free expression.99 Accordingly the court explained, to avoid
chilling "First Amendment freedoms through uncertainty, we
find it reasonable to require a plaintiff to prove in each case,
that the publisher invaded his privacy with reckless
disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the
invasion highly offensive.'
100
The following year, in Forscher v. Bugliosi,0' the
California Supreme Court considered whether a book written
by the defendant, the former prosecutor of Charles Manson,
invaded the plaintiffs privacy by describing the plaintiffs
association with Manson and implicating the plaintiff in a
murder.' 2 In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the case
on demurrer, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its balancing
approach and restated the newsworthiness factors.'
97. Id. at 40. The court explained that the social policy of rehabilitating ex-
criminals may outweigh the press's right to publish. "Once legal proceedings
have concluded, and particularly once the individual has reverted to the lawful
and unexciting life led by the rest of the community, the public's interest in
knowing is less compelling." Id. at 43.
98. Id. at 40.
In a nation built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it is always
difficult to declare that something may not be published. But the
general interest in an unfettered press may at times be outweighed by
other great societal interests. As a people, we have come to recognize
that one of these societal interests is that of protecting the individual's
right to privacy. The right to know and the right to have others not
know are, simplistically considered, irreconcilable. But the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of
the right to privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a
minimum of intrusion upon the other.
Id.
99. Id. at 43 (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C.
Cir. 1968)).
100. Id. at 44.
101. 608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980).
102. Forscher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 717-22 (Cal. 1980).
103. Id. at 724-28.
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However, the court went to great lengths to diminish the role
of social policy in balancing the First Amendment against
privacy rights by limiting the holding of Briscoe. 114 The court
stated the following:
California courts have refrained from extending the
Briscoe rule to other fact situations.... Our decision in
Briscoe was an exception to the more general rule that
once a man has become a public figure, or news, he
remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to
the end of his days.1 °5
Therefore, the California Supreme Court expanded the scope
of newsworthiness protection for the press and downplayed
the importance of policy considerations in the balancing
process. ' °6 Although the court did not eliminate the role of
policy completely from its calculus, the court's opinion seemed
to indicate that only an exceptionally strong social policy
would outweigh the newsworthiness of a publication in future
public disclosure of private facts tort cases.0 7
After the California Supreme Court's expansion of the
newsworthiness privilege in Forscher, it appeared that the
public disclosure of private facts tort had lost its bite.
However, the appellate court decision in Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, Inc. 10' confirmed that the public disclosure tort still
had some teeth. In Diaz, the plaintiff, who was the student
body president of a local community college, sued a local
newspaper after it published an article"9 indicating that she
had undergone an earlier sex-change operation."0 Diaz, who
kept the surgery a secret from all but her family and closest
friends, had changed her name and made all necessary
changes to her identification records."' The jury found for the
104. Id. at 725-26.
105. Id. at 726.
106. Id. at 727-28.
107. Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 727-28 (Cal. 1980).
108. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
109. The article stated:
The students at the College of Alameda will be surprised to learn that
their student body president, Toni Diaz, is no lady, but is in fact a man
whose real name is Antonio. Now I realize, that in these times, such a
matter is no big deal, but I suspect his female classmates in P.E. 97
may wish to make other showering arrangements.
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
110. Id. at 765.
111. Id.
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plaintiff and the defendant appealed, " 2 claiming the trial
court had erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant
had the burden of proving his publication newsworthy.
1 1 3
Although the court agreed with the defendant that the
jury had been improperly instructed on the burden of proof
regarding newsworthiness,"' the court examined the
newsworthiness issue in greater detail and struck a blow in
favor of privacy rights."' The court stated that
newsworthiness is to be "measured along a sliding scale of
competing interests""6 by using the three-factor test of
Kapellas."' The court explained that the newsworthiness of a
publication "depends upon contemporary community mores
and standards of decency [which] is largely a question of fact
[that] a jury is uniquely well-suited to decide.""8
Acknowledging that allowing a jury to decide this issue
creates a danger of punishing unpopular speech and
persons,"' the court felt "any risk of prejudice may be checked
112. Id. at 766.
113. Id.
114. The court found that the important societal benefit conferred by a free
and uncoerced press warranted placing the burden of proving newsworthiness
on the plaintiff. Id. at 768-69.
115. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771-73 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
Of course the right to privacy is not absolute and must be balanced
against the often competing constitutional right of the press to publish
newsworthy matters. ... However, the newsworthy privilege is not
without limitation. Where the publicity is so offensive as to constitute
.a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake..."
it serves no legitimate public interest and is not deserving of
protection.
Id. at 767 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D, cmt. h.
(Tentative Draft, No. 21, 1975)).
116. The court emphasized the importance of striking a balance between the
individual's right to keep private facts from the public's gaze and the public's
right to know. Because each of these rights is of great importance, the court
indicated that evaluation of the interests requires careful scrutiny of the facts
involved. Id. at 771.
117. Id.
In an effort to reconcile these competing interests, our courts have
settled on a three-part test for determining whether matter published
is newsworthy: "[1] the social value of the facts published, [2] the depth
of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and [3] the
extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public
notoriety."
Id. (quoting Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969)).
118. Id. at 772.
119. Id.
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by close judicial scrutiny at the stages of litigation."' The
court noted that the same concerns about juries sanctioning
unpopular speech are also present in the "related field of
obscenity law, where community standards define which
speech is constitutionally protected."12' Thus, the court
concluded, a jury should decide whether the "connection
between the information disclosed" 2 and the newsworthiness
of the subject matter are sufficiently close so as to insulate
the press from tort liability.
13
Despite the attempts of the Diaz court to reaffirm the
public disclosure tort as a check on intrusive media coverage,
a ruling by another state appellate court in Sipple v.
Chronicle Publishing Co.,124 broadened the scope of the
media's newsworthy privilege. In Sipple, the court considered
whether summary judgment had properly been granted in
favor of a group of media defendants that published an article
disclosing the appellant's homosexuality after he foiled an
assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford's life. 25 In
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment,126 the
appellate court held that the disclosure of Sipple's
homosexuality was a matter of legitimate public concern and,
therefore, newsworthy because it dispelled the myth that
homosexuals were weak.
27
After setting forth the elements of the tort, 28 the court
120. Id. Procedures such as summary judgment, directed verdicts, and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict could be used to curb unfettered jury
discretion.
121. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
122. Id. The court's use of the term "connection" is significant because it
indicates that the court believes there must be some relationship between the
information disclosed and the underlying subject matter that makes press
coverage of the matter newsworthy.
123. Id.
124. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
125. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
126. Id. at 671.
127. Id. at 669.
128. Id. at 667-68 (citations omitted).
It is well settled that there are three elements of a cause of action
predicated on tortious invasion of privacy. First, the disclosure of the
private facts must be a public disclosure. Second the facts disclosed
must be private facts, and not public ones. Third, the mater made
public must be one which would be offensive and objectionable to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
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noted that summary judgment is a preferred procedure in
resolving these cases because it eliminates protracted
litigation that would otherwise have a chilling effect on the
exercise of First Amendment rights."9  The court broadly
stated that "due to the supreme mandate of the constitutional
protection of freedom of the press even a tortious invasion of
one's privacy is exempt from liability if the publication of
private facts is truthful and newsworthy."130  Rather than
simply applying the standard three-factor Kapellas
newsworthiness test, the court seemed to create a new test for
newsworthiness. The court explained that the
paramount test of newsworthiness is whether the matter
is of legitimate public interest which in turn must be
determined according to the community mores.... The
line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and
becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private
lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of
the public, with decent standards, would say he had no
131
concern.
Although it is unclear whether this court attempted to forge a
new test for newsworthiness, it certainly expanded the
newsworthiness privilege for the press.
D. The United States Supreme Court's Balancing of Privacy
and Freedom of the Press
The only Supreme Court decision considering the
common law public disclosure of private facts tort is Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn."' In Cox, the father of a raped
129. Id. at 668.
130. Id. at 668. It appears that this court felt a publisher may not be held
liable for the publication of private facts so long as the subject matter of the
publicity is of legitimate public concern. Rather than engaging in a balancing of
interests or examining the connection between the information disclosed and
the subject matter of legitimate concern, the court here established a bright line
standard to evaluate these cases.
131. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(quoting Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) ).
132. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Generally, the Supreme Court will not review state
court decisions in the area of torts because the Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state court decisions is limited. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Usually, the
Court only reviews state tort decisions if federal questions are involved or
Constitutional defenses are asserted. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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and murdered teenager brought an action for invasion of
privacy against a local television station based upon a
Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanor to publish or
broadcast the name of a rape victim.' The reporter obtained
the name of the victim from the indictment and identified the
victim during a news broadcast.' The trial court held that
the father had a legally cognizable claim for invasion of
privacy based on the reporter's violation of section 26-9901 of
the Georgia Code. 3 1 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court
rejected the appellant's claim that the victim's name was a
matter of public interest that could be published with
impunity under the First Amendment.
3 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the Georgia Supreme Court.' 7 The Court held that the
state may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, impose sanctions on the accurate publication of
a rape victim's name obtained from judicial records that are
maintained in connection with a public prosecution and that
themselves are open to public inspection.' 8  Because the
reporter based his televised report upon notes taken during
court proceedings and from official court documents open to
public inspection, the Supreme Court ruled that liability
could not be imposed for giving additional publicity to
truthful information already available to the public.9
In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that the
"commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and
judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . . are
without question events of legitimate concern to the public
and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to
report the operations of government."'40 Moreover, the Court
indicated that the interests of privacy fade when the
133. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
134. Cox Broad. Corp., v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472-74 (1975).
135. Id. at 474.
136. Id. at 475.
137. Id. at 497.
138. Id. at 492-96.
139. Id. at 494 (citing comment c of section 652B of the Restatement of Torts
which states: "There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further
publicity to information about the plaintiff which is already public."). Id. at 495.
140. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). The Court ruled
that public records, by their very nature, are of interest to those concerned with
the administration of government. Consequently, the media confers a public
benefit when it reports the true contents of public records.
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information involved already appears in public records,
"especially when viewed in terms of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous
press.""1
However, the Court noted that the public disclosure of
private facts tort is not without force, as strong arguments
can be made that there is a zone of privacy surrounding every
individual,'42 which states may protect from intrusion by the
press. The Court stated that the interests of both privacy
and free press are plainly rooted in the traditions and
significant concerns of our society.' Nonetheless, the Court
ruled that the appellant's broadcasting of information
contained in public records outweighed the appellee's interest
in privacy under the circumstances of the case. "' However,
the Court cautioned that its holding was narrow and did not
stand for the proposition that all publications of truthful
information are immune from criminal or civil liability."
The United State Supreme Court has not reviewed
another common law public disclosure of private facts case.
However, the Court did consider a similar statutory cause of
action in Florida Star v. B.J.F.17  In B.J.F., the appellant,
Florida Star, a newspaper company, was sued for invasion of
privacy for publicly naming the appellee as the victim of a
rape.4 8  The newspaper obtained the victim's name from a
copy of the police report that was sent to the pressroom.'49 In
publishing B.J.F.'s identity, the newspaper not only violated
its own internal policy of not printing the names of rape
141. Id.
142. "Indeed, the central thesis of the root article written by Warren and
Brandeis... was that the press was overstepping its prerogatives by publishing
essentially private information and that there should be a remedy for the
alleged abuses." Id. at 487.
143. See EMERSON, supra note 11, at 544-62; Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as
an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962
(1964); Milton R. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966).
144. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
145. Id. at 496. With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the press
functions to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial
effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
146. Cox, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97.
147. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
148. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527-28 (1989).
149. Id. at 526.
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victims, but also violated section 794.03 of the Florida Penal
Code, which made it unlawful to "print, publish, or
broadcast.., in any instrument of mass communication" the
name of a victim of a sexual offense.' The plaintiffs civil
action was based upon negligence with the violation of the
criminal statute being used as a predicate for a negligence per
se instruction.' Pursuant to this statute, the Florida Star
was found negligent per se.' The Supreme Court of Florida
denied discretionary review."3
In reviewing the decision of the lower courts, the United
States Supreme Court indicated that its past decisions
involving governmental attempts to sanction the accurate
dissemination of information had not exhaustively considered
the conflict between the right of free press and the right of
privacy."' "[A]lthough our decisions have without exception
upheld the press's right to publish, we have emphasized each
time that we were resolving this conflict only as it arose in a
discrete factual context.""' In emphasizing the narrowness of
its prior holdings, the Court stated that it "continue[d] to
believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests
presented in clashes between the First Amendment and
privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the
instant case.""' Therefore, the Court maintained that the
publication of lawfully obtained truthful information about a
matter of public significance cannot constitutionally be
punished without a need to further a state interest of the
highest order."'
Applying this rule, the Court found section 794.03 to be
an unconstitutional restraint on the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of press."8 Again, just as in Cox, the
150. FLA. STAT. ch. 794.03 (1987).
151. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 528.
152. Id. at 535.
153. Id.
154. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 533.
157. Id. (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1997)).
158. Id. at 541. The Court reached this conclusion by conducting a three-part
analysis. Id. at 536-40. First, the Court considered whether the information
had been lawfully obtained. Id. at 536. Because the appellant received the
information from the sheriffs department in a police report, the acquisition of
that information was deemed lawful. Id. Second, the Court considered whether
1240 [Vol. 39
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS
Court stated that its holding was limited. The Court
expressly stated it was unwilling to hold that truthful
publications are automatically constitutionally protected, or
that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the
state may protect the individual from intrusion by the
press. 9 Rather, the Court only held that "where a newspaper
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest
order .... ,' Under the facts presented, the Court concluded
that no such interest was satisfactorily presented. 6'
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has yet to hold
that the right of free press is outweighed by an individual's
right of privacy. 6 2 However, the Court has recognized that a
right of privacy not only exists, but also that such a right is
deeply rooted in the history and traditions of our country.6 '
The Court has refused to hold that the publication of lawfully
obtained truthful information can never be subject to criminal
or civil liability.' Rather, the Court has resolved each
privacy case on its own discrete facts,'65 emphasizing that
information relating to the administration of justice and
government activities warrants the greatest amount of First
Amendment protection.'66
E. Recent California Supreme Court Case Suggests a New
Approach to the Public Disclosure of Private Facts Tort
In June of 1998, the California Supreme Court rendered
a plurality opinion in Shulman v. Group W Productions,
punishing the press for disseminating information that is already publicly
available is likely to advance the state's interest in protecting the privacy of a
rape victim, and concluded that it would not. Id. at 537. Finally, the Court's
last consideration was whether timidity and self-censorship would result from
allowing the media to be punished for publishing certain truthful information.
The Court concluded that such a rule would lead to self-censorship and
impermissibly chill freedom of speech and press. Id.
159. Id. at 541.
160. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 539.
163. See supra notes 138-158 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 138-158 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 138-158 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 138-158 and accompanying text.
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Inc.,1"7 which appears to have established a new approach to
analyzing public disclosure of private facts tort cases. In
Shulman, the court considered whether the producer of a
documentary invaded the privacy of two accident victims by
broadcasting scenes from the accident and statements made
by the victims to rescue personnel.168 The plaintiffs sued the
producer claiming that the transmission of the documentary
constituted an actionable public disclosure of private facts
and that the manner in which the defendant acquired the
information was an intrusion on their privacy rights. 69 The
California Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial
court concluding that summary judgment should have been
granted in favor of the defendant.17 °
The court began its novel approach to this issue by
recognizing the inherent difficulty of striking a balance
between the competing interests of an individual's right to
privacy and the societal interest in the right of free press.171
The court then cited to the decision in Diaz and stated the
elements of the public disclosure of private facts tort.172 The
167. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
168. Id. at 475-77.
169. Id. at 476. Although the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that
summary judgment was inappropriate on the intrusion claim, this comment will
focus exclusively on the Court's treatment of the public disclosure of private
facts claim.
170. Id. at 488-89.
171. Id. at 474.
At what point does the publishing or broadcasting of otherwise private
words, expression and emotions cease to be protected by the press's
constitutional and common law privilege-its right to report on matters
of legitimate public interest-and become an unjustified, actionable
invasion of the subject's private life? How can the courts fashion and
administer meaningful rules for protecting privacy without
unconstitutionally setting themselves up as censors or editors .... ?
Questions of this nature have concerned courts and commentators at
least since Warren and Brandeis wrote their seminal article, and
continue to do so to this day.
Id.
172. Id. at 478 (citing Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
The court also noted that the Diaz formulation of the public disclosure elements
is quite similar to the approach taken by the Restatement, which provides:
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that ... (a) would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person and . . . (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.
Id. (alteration in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D
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court explained that the critical element to be evaluated is
the "presence or absence of legitimate public interest, i.e.,
newsworthiness, in the facts disclosed."17 Up until this point,
the court's approach had been consistent with prior
precedent. However, the court's next statement broke with
prior case law:
[LIack of newsworthiness is an element of the private facts
tort, making newsworthiness a complete bar to common
law liability.... [W]here the facts disclosed about a
limited, involuntary public figure bear a logical
relationship to the newsworthy subject of the broadcast
and are not intrusive in great disproportion to their
relevance-the broadcast [is] of legitimate public concern,
barring liability under the private facts tort.
17 4
The court concluded that "under California common law
the dissemination of truthful, newsworthy material is not
actionable as a publication of private facts."'75 Thus, it
appears that the court abrogated its prior balancing test in
favor of a bright line rule that newsworthy publications may
never be sanctioned.
76
Although the Shulman plurality recognized
newsworthiness as a complete bar to liability, the court
lamented the difficulties of delineating the exact contours of
this constitutional privilege. The court noted that defining
the scope of the newsworthiness privilege is "particularly
problematic, because this privilege has not received extensive
attention from the United States Supreme Court" 77 and when
the Court has considered the issue, its holdings have been
"deliberately and explicitly narrow."7 ' Moreover,
(1979)).
173. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 479.
176. The California Supreme Court attempted to reconcile this radical
departure from prior precedent by characterizing its prior decisions as broad
enough in scope to embrace such a rule. The court noted: "Our own decisions
are consistent, if less explicit on this point." Id. at 478.
177. Id. at 479.
178. Id.
Like Cox Broadcasting, the Florida Star decision provides little general
guidance as to what is and is not "a matter of public significance"-
what is newsworthy, in other words--or as to when, if ever, the
protection of private facts against public disclosure should be
considered a sufficiently important state interest to justify civil liability
pursuant to the common law tort.
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understanding what the term newsworthy means is also
problematic "because it may be used as either a descriptive or
normative term."'79  The court recognized that an extreme
position on either side would have unacceptable
consequences:
If newsworthiness is completely descriptive-if all
coverage that sells papers or boosts ratings is deemed
newsworthy-it would seem to swallow the publication of
private facts tort .... At the other extreme, if
newsworthiness is viewed as a purely normative concept,
the courts could become to an unacceptable degree editors
of the news and self appointed guardians of public taste. 8°
To help the court resolve the ambiguity inherent in the
term "newsworthy," the court referred to earlier case law and
constitutional doctrine. 8' Although citing to the Kapellas
three-factor balancing test for guidance, the court criticized
its ad hoc approach as too often leading to a"discounting
society's stake in First Amendment rights ... and unwittingly
chill[ing] free speech rights."'82 Rather than employing a
multi-factored balancing test, the plurality opinion created a
newsworthiness test that focuses on the "logical relationship
or nexus, or the lack thereof, between the events or activities
that brought the person into the public eye and the particular
facts disclosed."' The court acknowledged that this standard
Id. at 480.
179. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 481 (Cal. 1998).
The court grappled with this dichotomy: "Is the term 'newsworthy a descriptive
predicate, intended to refer to the fact that there is widespread public interest?
Or is it a value predicate, intended to indicate that the publication is a
meritorious contribution and that the public's interest is praiseworthy?" Id.
(quoting Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in
the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 722, 725 (1963)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 480-84.
182. Id. at 486.
183. Id. at 484-85.
This approach accords with our own prior decisions, in that it balances
the public's right to know against the plaintiffs privacy interest by
drawing a protective line at the point the material revealed ceases to
have any substantial connection to the subject matter of the
newsworthy report.... This approach also echoes the Restatement
commentators' widely quoted and cited view that legitimate public
interest does not include a morbid and sensational prying into private
lives for its own sake.
Id. at 485.
1244 [Vol. 39
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS
grants "considerable deference to reporters and editors.' 184
The court explained:
it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is
best covered. The constitutional privilege to publish
truthful material ceases to operate only when an editor
abuses his broad discretion to publish matters that are of
legitimate interest. By confining our interference to the
extreme cases, the courts avoid unduly limiting ... the
free exercise of editorial judgment. Nor is newsworthiness
governed by the tastes or limited interests of an individual
judge or juror; a publication is newsworthy if some
reasonable members of the community could entertain a
legitimate interest in it.1
8 5
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
As the previous cases illustrate, the public disclosure of
private facts tort presents complex legal problems. Because
resolution of these cases requires courts to strike a balance
between the competing interests of individual privacy rights
and the media's right to free speech, courts often must make
difficult policy judgments.' As a result, courts have often
established narrow holdings and decided many of these cases
on their own discrete facts.'87 This principle is clearly
reflected by the narrow and limited holdings of the United
States Supreme Court and the fact specific holdings of
California courts. Although these courts have
acknowledged that there may be times when truthful
publications can be sanctioned, these courts have failed to
articulate a sufficiently reliable approach to the public
184. Id.
185. Id. at 485. "Our analysis does not purport to distinguish among the
various legitimate purposes that may be served by truthful publications and
broadcasts.... [Tihe constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression apply
with equal force to the publication whether it be a news report or an
entertainment feature." Id. The court held,
newsworthiness is not limited to "news" in the narrow sense of reports
of current events. It extends also to the uses of names, likeness or facts
in giving information to the public for purposes of education,
amusement, or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be
expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.
Id. at 485-86.
186. See supra Part II.A-E.
187. See supra Part II.
188. See supra Part II.B-E.
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disclosure of private facts tort.'89
Although courts recognize that the newsworthiness of a
publication is central to determining whether an actionable
public disclosure of private facts has occurred, great
uncertainty remains as to how this determination should be
made. The United States Supreme Court has not established
a test for newsworthiness and California courts have
continually modified their approach to resolving public
disclosure of private facts cases. 9 ' Based upon the California
Supreme Court's plurality decision in Shulman, serious doubt
has been created as to whether a bright line test, which is
highly deferential to the press, has abrogated ad hoc
balancing.' As a result, several questions have arisen as to
how individual privacy rights should be protected.
Should all truthful publications receive the same level of
First Amendment protection?'92 Although judicial concern
about chilling free speech provides sufficient reason for courts
to carefully scrutinize public disclosure tort cases, does it
provide a sufficient basis for courts to rubber stamp motions
for summary judgment by media defendants? Should judges
be allowed to unilaterally impose their own value systems in
lieu of allowing the voice of the community to be heard? How
should newsworthiness be determined? Should courts still
employ an ad hoc balancing test that utilizes the three factors
of Kapellas, or should courts apply the bright line, highly
deferential logical relationship test of Shulman?
This comment argues that courts should differentiate
between the level of First Amendment protection accorded to
publications discussing public matters and those discussing
private matters.9 ' Courts should use an ad hoc balancing test
instead of bright line tests when evaluating whether or not a
given publication is newsworthy.' In addition, in utilizing
189. See supra Part II.
190. See supra Part II.B-E.
191. See supra Part II.E.
192. As history reveals, the purpose of the First Amendment was to give
people the freedom to express their beliefs without fear of imprisonment or
sanctions from a strong central government. The First Amendment was
designed to serve as a check on the operations of government and the
administration of justice, not to foster the publication of gossip. See generally
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1966).
193. See infra Part IV.A.
194. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
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this balancing approach, courts should not apply this test in a
manner that is highly deferential to the media. 9' Rather,
summary judgment should seldom be granted in these
cases.'96 The jury, as the voice of the community,'97 should be
allowed to determine when the media has abused its
publication privilege.9 Ultimately, this comment concludes
that a failure by courts to implement such an approach to
public disclosure of private facts cases will leave individual
privacy rights under-protected in an era where expanding
technology and commercial journalism threaten to completely
obliterate the line between the public and private sphere.9
IV. ANALYSIS
Although courts have generally accepted the existence of
a right to privacy, they have continually held that this right is
not absolute. 6° At some point, the public interest in obtaining
information becomes dominant over the individual's desire for
privacy.20 ' However, courts have also continually held that
the First Amendment is not absolute.2  Speech that creates a
clear and present danger, profane speech, obscenity, and
commercial speech have all received limited First
Amendment protection.0 3  Thus, courts facing public
disclosure of private facts tort cases must reconcile the
competing rights of privacy and free speech, neither of which
is absolute. Striking the balance between these rights has
been very difficult for courts. 4
195. See infra Part IV.B.3.
196. See infra Part IV.B.3.
197. See generally Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
198. See infra Part IV.B.3.
199. See infra Part VI.
200. See supra Part II.
201. See supra Part II.
202. See supra Part II.
203. See generally Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica,
438 U.S. 726 (1978); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
204. As the law stands today, a plaintiff in a public disclosure of private facts
tort action has a very difficult case to prove in order to recover damages. See
Barbara Moretti, Note, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy?
The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857, 899 (1993). See also supra notes 164-182 and
accompanying text. Although establishing whether a particular publication is
newsworthy used to involve the analysis of policy considerations, careful
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This comment argues that courts confronted with public
disclosure of private facts tort cases should distinguish
between the level of First Amendment protection accorded to
those publications that cover matters of general political,
social, or judicial concern and those publications that cover
private information about individuals."5 Such a standard
would not unduly chill the press, nor interfere with free
speech rights. Rather, such a standard would take proper
account of individual privacy rights, while at the same time
allowing proper breathing space for the marketplace of ideas
to flourish. In addition, courts should continue to apply an ad
hoc balancing approach rather than the bright line test
advocated by the plurality in Shulman."6 Far from being an
unworkable standard, an ad hoc balancing approach would
allow courts to take proper account of the competing interests
at stake in each case and allow courts to consider the totality
of the circumstances.
This comment also argues that summary judgment
should not be a preferred procedure in resolving public
disclosure of private facts cases.0 7 Although judicial concerns
about chilling free speech are appropriate, these concerns are
more theoretical than practical. Allowing judges to rule as a
matter of law, simply because the First Amendment is
implicated, deprives an aggrieved plaintiff of the opportunity
to have the community evaluate the intrusiveness of the
publication. Moreover, because the public disclosure of
private facts tort merely affords injured plaintiffs
compensatory relief after an article has been published, there
is no danger that this tort will function as a prior restraint
upon the press. Rather than censoring what the press may
examination of the circumstances surrounding the publication, and balancing of
competing rights, recent case law appears to have abandoned this ad hoc
approach. See supra Part II.E. Rather than applying a multi-factored
balancing test, it appears a bright line test is now favored in resolving these
cases. See supra Part II.E. Currently, in California, it appears if there is a
truthful publication of newsworthy material, a plaintiff does not have a cause of
action. Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). The
effectiveness of the private facts tort has gradually been declining as the
categories of newsworthy disclosures have expanded. Some argue this defense
has "swallowed" the tort. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966).
205. See infra Part IV.A.
206. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
207. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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publish, the public disclosure of private facts tort simply
encourages the press to exercise greater professional
responsibility when determining what they will publish.
Instead of allowing the press to have carte blanche power to
destroy lives by publishing private facts with impunity, the
public disclosure tort forces publishers to make a business
decision-whether the price of destroying someone's life can
be justified by commercial profits.
A. The True Purpose of the First Amendment Is to Contribute
to the Marketplace of Ideas, Not to Invade Personal Privacy
In order to strike the appropriate balance between the
right of privacy and free press, it is necessary to understand
both the purpose and the scope of the First Amendment. °8
Although the First Amendment is one of the most cherished
liberties of our society, it has never been held to be absolute.0 9
The limits on the scope of the First Amendment become more
apparent as the rights it seeks to protect clash with other
constitutional rights or competing interests such as morality
and decency."O Thus, when evaluating First Amendment
cases, courts must proceed cautiously to ensure that the First
Amendment does not swallow other interests that society
deems worthy of protection. This is especially true when it
comes to the right of privacy. 1'
208. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 153.
The right of privacy is antithetical to [the] American ideal: an open and
outspoken press. Americans have always been proud of a strong First
Amendment.... [T]he Founding Fathers considered a free press to be
the bulwark of liberty, and that some 'bad' speech must be tolerated so
that 'good' speech-and truth-can flourish. Indeed, in America
freedom of the press is more than just a principle.
Id.
209. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating that the First
Amendment "even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited"); see also
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that even "[tihe most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic").
210. "These boundaries are not always marked by bright lines, and are
generally best defined on a case-by-case basis." Marin Indep. Journal v.
Municipal Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See also Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
211. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971).
In a nation built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it is always
difficult to declare that something may not be published. But the great
general interest in an unfettered press may at times be outweighed by
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The dangers of abusing the First Amendment are
particularly high in the area of public disclosure of private
facts, '2 because of ambiguity regarding what the public has a
right to know.213 Determining what the public has a right to
know has become an increasingly difficult issue as society has
modernized and become more complex. Because of limits on
people's time and resources, the press has taken on the role of
defining what the people have a right to know and, more
accurately, what they want to know.214 This principle was
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in Cox:
"great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news
media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of
government, and official records and documents open to
public inspection." ' 5  However, it is unclear to what extent
the press is entitled to intrude into private matters without
incurring tort liability. The confusion stems from
determining when, if ever, the publication of lawfully
obtained truthful information constitutes an unwarranted
revelation of private information that the public has no
legitimate interest in receiving.216
The United States Supreme Court's treatment of the
right of privacy demonstrates that it has been unwilling to
take a strong position in resolving the conflict between free
press and privacy rights." ' Although the Court struck the
balance in favor of free speech in both Cox and B.J.F., the
other great societal interests. As a people we have come to recognize
that one of these societal interests is that of protecting an individual's
right to privacy. The right to know and the right to have others not
know are, simplistically considered, irreconcilable. But the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of
the right to privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a
minimum of intrusion upon the other.
Id.
212. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
There is a fertile medium in this field of torts for the production of
conflicts between the right of the individual to be let alone, and the
right of the public to know-the latter concept being crystalized in our
age old concept of freedom of speech and of the press.
Id.
213. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
214. See Cox Broad. Corp., v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
215. Id.
216. See supra Part II.
217. See supra Part II.A.
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Court's holdings were extremely narrow."' Despite having
had the opportunity to broadly hold that the publication of
truthful information could never be sanctioned, the Court
expressly avoided such a broad holding. 19 Instead of utilizing
powerful sweeping language to signal the death knell of
privacy rights, the Court struggled to limit its holdings to the
discrete factual situations presented in Cox and B.J.F.21° As a
result of these narrow decisions, the Supreme Court has
indicated that a right of privacy does exist and that the states
have the ability to impose tort liability when the media
abuses the First Amendment.2   What could be more powerful
than the Supreme Court's express statement that it was
unwilling to hold that publications of truthful information
could never be sanctioned?
22
The Court noted in both Cox and B.J.F. that the key
218. The narrowness of the United States Supreme Court's holdings in these
cases was discussed by the California Supreme Court in its Shulman opinion.
The California Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Cox was "deliberately and explicitly narrow." Shulman v. Group W
Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998). It also explained that the United
States Supreme Court "proceeded cautiously and on limited grounds" in its
B.J.F. opinion. Id. at 480.
219. See Cox Broad. Corp., v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
Rather than address the broader question whether truthful
publications may never be subjected to civil or criminal liability
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it
another way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area of
privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to
focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that this
case presents ....
Id.
220. "[A]lthough our decisions have without exception upheld the press' right
to publish, we have emphasized each time that we were resolving this conflict
only as it arose in a discrete factual context." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 527-28 (1989).
221. See generally Part II.D. "We do not hold that a truthful publication is
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the
press." B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 535.
222. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 495.
The Court's concern for a free press is appropriate, but such concerns
should be balanced against rival interests in a civilized and humane
society. An absolutist view of the former leads to insensitivity as to the
later. ... While I would not want to live in a society where freedom of
the press was unduly limited, I also find regrettable an interpretation
of the First Amendment that fosters such a degree of irresponsibility on
the part of the news media.
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consideration was the source from which the press obtained
its information.223 In Cox, the victim's name was obtained
from a criminal indictment, which is a public record.224 In
B.J.F., the victim's name was obtained from police reports,
which are also public records.22'  Thus, because the press
simply gave further publication to matters that were already
of public record, it could not be sanctioned for further
disseminating the information. 226 To reach these conclusions,
the Court relied on the "responsibility of the press to
report the operations of government" including judicial
proceedings regarding crimes, and the premise that "[b]y
placing the information in the public domain on official
court records, the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby being
served.227
Thus, because the Court was addressing cases where the
challenged publications were related to the operations of
government and the administration of justice, liability could
not be imposed.228
The operations of government and judicial proceedings
are among the most newsworthy subjects, which the public
clearly has a right to know.229 Consequently, the scope of
First Amendment protection is at its pinnacle when
publications relate to these matters.2 °  In addition,
information contained in public records, which have already
been published by the government, are also entitled to broad
First Amendment protection. '31 The very fact that the
government has published this information indicates that the
information is of legitimate concern to the public, protected by
the First Amendment.232 But, the question remains, to what
223. See supra Part II.D.
224. Cox, 420 U.S. at 469.
225. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 526.
226. See supra Part II.D.
227. Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 480 (Cal. 1998)
(quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-95 (1975).
228. See supra Part II.A.
229. As stated by the Court in Cox, publications related to crimes, the
prosecutions of crimes, and judicial proceedings are matters of legitimate
concern. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491. In addition, the Court noted that the
administration of government also constitutes newsworthy subject matter. Id.
230. See supra Part IV.A.
231. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 495; 491 U.S. at 535.
232. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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extent does the First Amendment protect truthful
publications that are not related to the operations of
government, judicial proceedings, or matters of public record?
This question has been left unanswered by the Supreme
Court. However, had the Supreme Court intended the First
Amendment to protect all truthful publications by the press,
it would have expressly stated that intent. Instead, the Court
merely indicated that the scope of First Amendment is
broadest when publications relate to government operations
and the administration of justice.233 The Supreme Court's
refusal to hold that all truthful publications are privileged
implies that certain subject matters do not warrant the same
level of First Amendment protection afforded to publications
relating to the operations of government, judicial proceedings,
and public records. This reflects the ideology that the First
Amendment should foster an atmosphere for the free
exchange of ideas.234  However, idle gossip about
embarrassing private facts does not provide a valuable
contribution to the marketplace of ideas. As such, this type of
speech should receive only qualified First Amendment
protection.
Americans want to keep abreast with the news of the day
and be fully informed about current events in the world, but
not at the cost of our own privacy.23 It is universally accepted
The publication of truthful information available on the public record
contains none of the indicia of those limited categories of expression,
such as "fighting" words, which 'are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and "are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."
Id.
233. This view of the role of the First Amendment was also expressed in the
California state case of Briscoe: "The central purpose of the First Amendment 'is
to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible
participation in the understanding of those problems with which the citizens of
a self-governing society must deal ... ." Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 483
P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKELHOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1960)).
234. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (holding that
"the predominant purpose of the grant of immunity was to preserve an
untrammeled press as a vital source of public information" on government
affairs).
235. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 210.
When the media uses its strength to uncover government corruption or
lay bare a public lie, it is the country's watchdog. But when the animal
roams into our cherished private sphere, it seems to turn dangerous
1999] 1253
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that the First Amendment does not set up a wall of immunity
that protects the media from criminal and tort liability simply
because they are gathering news.236 Thus, courts should
apply a multi-factored balancing test to determine when
publications of private facts are truly newsworthy and
thereby deserving of First Amendment protection.2"7 Courts
should not apply a highly deferential standard to all truthful
publications."8 Rather than applying the First Amendment
broadly when reviewing privacy claims, courts should look
very closely at the subject matter of the article and extend
only qualified First Amendment protection to matters that
are of a private nature.2 9
B. California Courts Struggle to Create a Judicial Approach
to Newsworthiness
California courts had long utilized an ad hoc balancing
approach to determine the newsworthiness of published
material.24 8  Courts considered the newsworthiness of a
and predatory. Then we Americans turn on the press. We want a free
press, but not that free. In a country where individuals treasure their
personal sovereignty as much as free expression, the current legal
conflict between privacy and the press was inevitable. In fact, it was
outrage at the press that "created" the legal right to privacy in the first
place.
Id.
236. "Can it be said that the press has a constitutional right to inquire and to
inform? In our view it cannot. It is because the public has a right to know that
the press has a function to inquire and to inform." Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d
1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973)). "The press, then, cannot be said to have
any right to give information greater than the extent to which the public is
entitled to have information." Id. See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
237. See infra Part V.
238. See infra Part V.
239. See infra Part V. The distinction between private figures and public
figures is crucial in determining whether liability will be imposed in defamation
cases. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.96, 98 (1975). A similar analysis should
be employed in privacy cases. However, instead of focusing on the status of the
plaintiff, more attention should be directed to the content of the subject matter.
Clearly, a story revealing that a governor had cheated on a college exam should
be treated differently than a story disclosing that a private citizen had vomited
in a restaurant. The former story portrays a public figure's ability to carry out a
position as a government leader, whereas the later story serves little social
purpose and will likely cause great distress to that individual.
240. See supra Part II.B-C.
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publication in light of the following criteria: 1) the medium in
which the material was published; 2) the extent of the
publication's use; 3) the public interest served by the
publication; 4) the seriousness of the publication's
interference with the plaintiffs private life; 5) the social value
of the published facts; 6) the depth of the publication's
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs; 7) the extent to
which the plaintiff voluntarily acceded to a position of
notoriety; 8) the necessity of the published material; 9) the
morality of the publication; and 10) the policy implications
involved."' Only after considering all of these competing
factors were courts able to determine whether the publication
was of legitimate public concern and, therefore,
newsworthy. 4' However, based upon the California Supreme
Court's recent plurality decision in Shulman, it appears that
this judicial balancing approach to newsworthiness may have
been abrogated in favor of a new bright line standard.243
According to the lead opinion in Shulman, "where the
facts disclosed about a limited, involuntary public figure bear
a logical relationship to the newsworthy subject of the
broadcast and are not intrusive in great disproportion to their
relevance-the broadcast [is] of legitimate concern. ' 44 Under
this new standard, courts do not engage in balancing to
determine whether a publication is newsworthy. Rather,
courts merely conduct an analysis focusing on the "logical
relationship or nexus, or lack thereof, between the events or
activities that brought the person into the public eye and the
particular facts disclosed."245 According to the court,
an analysis focusing on relevance allows courts and juries
to decide most cases involving persons involuntarily
involved in events of public interest without "balanc[ing]
interests in ad hoc fashion in each case." The articulation
241. See supra Part II.B-C.
242. See supra Part II.B-C.
243. See supra Part II.E. Because Shulman was a plurality opinion, it
remains unclear whether the approach advocated in Justice Werdegar's opinion
will become controlling precedent. Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d
469 (Cal. 1998). The Court was divided in this case, leaving uncertainty as to
the proper judicial approach to analyzing public disclosure of private facts cases.
Id.
244. Id. at 478 (citing Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983)).
245. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
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of standards that do not require "ad hoc resolution of the
competing interests in each... case" is favored in areas
affecting First Amendment rights, because the relative
predictability of results reached under such standards
minimizes the inadvertent chilling of protected speech,
and because standards that can be applied objectively
provide a stronger shield against the unconstitutional
punishment of unpopular speech.246
The court also noted that this new approach was preferable to
ad hoc balancing because it confines judicial "interference to
extreme cases."247
In elaborating on its desire to limit judicial interference
with the publication process, the court stated that the
constitutional privilege to publish truthful material "'ceases
to operate only when an editor abuses his broad discretion to
publish matters that are of legitimate public interest."'2 48
Although the court did not precisely define what constitutes
an abuse of editorial discretion in the publication of private
facts, it appears that the court embraced the language of the
Restatement Second of Torts as reflected by the following
statement: "The challenged material was thus substantially
relevant to the newsworthy subject matter of the broadcast
and did not constitute a 'morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake.'"49
1. California Courts Should Continue to use an Ad Hoc
Balancing Test in Lieu of the Overly Deferential
Shulman Bright Line Approach
California courts evaluating public disclosure of private
246. Id. at 485-86. The Court elaborated on this idea stating: "An analysis
measuring newsworthiness of facts about a limited involuntary public figure by
their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates considerable
deference to reporters and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional
interference with the freedom of the press to report truthfully on matters of
legitimate public interest." Id. at 485. The Court further explicated that
newsworthiness is not "governed by the tastes or limited interests of an
individual judge or juror; a publication is newsworthy if some reasonable
members of the community could entertain a legitimate interest in it." Id. The
Court added, "[in general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular
story is best covered. Id.
247. Id. (quoting Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975)).
248. Shulman, 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (quoting Gilbert v. Medical
Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)).
249. Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D) (emphasis added).
1256 [Vol. 39
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS
facts cases prior to the Shulman decision utilized a balancing
approach that struck the correct balance between individual
privacy rights and free speech rights.25° Through the use of
an ad hoc balancing test, which closely analyzed the
particular facts presented, courts were able to consider all the
competing rights and social policies that were implicated in
each case. 5 ' This approach accorded sufficient protection for
privacy rights and served as a check on a persistent press,
constantly intruding deeper and deeper into the private
sphere.25 ' Because the balancing factors were well delineated
by prior case law,25 the media had sufficient notice regarding
what constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy and what
constitutes a protected newsworthy publication.
However, the California Supreme Court suddenly
abandoned sixty years of precedent in Shulman and created a
new judicial standard by which to analyze public disclosure of
private facts cases.5 4 This new standard, which seeks to
eliminate ad hoc judicial balancing, establishes a bright line
test for newsworthiness by examining the "logical
relationship" between the facts disclosed and the event giving
rise to the publication. Unfortunately, by limiting the judicial
inquiry to an assessment of whether there is a "gross
disproportion" between the facts disclosed and the subject
matter giving rise to the publication, ' the court has failed to
accord adequate protection to individual privacy rights.
The Shulman opinion explains that liability for the
public disclosure of private facts cannot be imposed where
"some reasonable members of the community could entertain
a legitimate interest in it." 56 But the court fails to adequately
explain when the public's interest is legitimate and when it is
not. Although the opinion refers to the Restatement's criteria
of "morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its
own sake" to explain when a publication is not of legitimate
250. See supra Part II.B-C.
251. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part II.B-C.
254. As stated by Justice Brown, "[Ilnexplicably, the plurality jettisons the
Kapellas newsworthiness test in favor of its own 'logical relationship' test."
Shulman, 955 P.2d at 503 (J. Brown dissenting).
255. See supra notes 164-182 and accompanying text.
256. Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998).
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concern, the court fails to expand upon this language.2 57 It
provides no examples of when the line would be crossed and
an actionable invasion of privacy would occur.258 Instead, the
court creates much uncertainty with the use of this
ambiguous terminology."9 For example, how is the "morbid
and sensational" standard to be applied? When is the line
crossed? What criteria should be used to determine when
private lives are being intruded into for "its own sake"?
Unlike the prior public disclosure of private facts cases,
where use of an ad hoc balancing test guaranteed that certain
factors would be considered by courts, the Shulman approach
does not guarantee that any specific criteria will be factored
into judicial determinations of when publications are of
legitimate public concern.26
The press should not be allowed to define what level of
privacy individual citizens are entitled to. It is the duty of
courts to strike the proper balance between the competing
interests of personal privacy and free speech. As stated by
Justice Brown, in her Shulman dissent, "[c]ontrary to the
plurality's claim that it is 'accommodating conflicting
interests in personal privacy and in press freedom as
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution,' in reality, it sacrifices the constitutional right
to privacy on the altar of the First Amendment." '' Jurors
who represent the values and views of the community should
determine when a publication is newsworthy and when it is
not. Failure to return to the ad hoc balancing approach will
greatly jeopardize personal privacy rights and will encourage
the press to delve ever deeper into personal lives for the sake
of commercial profits and voyeurism. A standard of extreme
deference, which only sanctions the publication of private
facts that are greatly disproportionate to the event giving rise
to those facts, simply provides inadequate protection of
privacy rights and gives the press carte blanche authority to
pry into private lives.
257. See supra notes 164-182 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 164-182 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 164-182 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 164-182 and accompanying text.
261. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 503 (quoting the majority opinion, Shulman, at
P.2d at 479).
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2. Ad Hoc Balancing Is a Workable Test that Enables
Courts to Strike the Proper Balance Between
Privacy Rights and Free Speech Rights
Although the Shulman plurality opinion attempted to
create a more predictable, bright line test for resolving public
disclosure of private facts cases, 62 the creation of a logical
relevance test focusing on the disparity between the facts
disclosed and the event giving rise to the publication,263 is
even more amorphous and unworkable than the use of ad hoc
balancing. Ad hoc balancing ensures that certain pre-
determined factors will be considered in assessing the
newsworthiness of a publication.2" As a result, the press is
on notice as to what factors may increase the chances that a
particular publication will be held to be an invasion of
privacy. However, the logical relationship test fails to
indicate what criteria, if any, courts will use when evaluating
the relationship between the facts disclosed and the event
giving rise to the publication. '65 This ambiguity, however,
from the press's perspective, is insignificant because the
plurality's new approach accords them virtually unlimited
reign to publish truthful information that is minimally
related to the subject matter giving rise to the publication.266
This uncertainty is extremely significant to individual
citizens whose private lives may now be revealed to all of
society.
Because the California Supreme Court's new approach is
excessively deferential to the press, personal privacy rights,
which are fundamental to self-autonomy and self-definition,
are left under-protected. No longer will citizens be able to
seek recourse from the courts as a way of deterring intrusive
media coverage. Despite the court's concession that
"[i]ntensely personal or intimate revelations might not, in a
given case, be considered newsworthy, 67 the court merely
paid lip service to this concept. 66 This is reflected by the
court's resolution of the factual scenario presented in
262. Id. at 486.
263. Id. at 478.
264. See supra Part II.B-C.
265. See supra Part II.E.
266. See Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 485-86 (Cal. 1998).
267. Id. at 486.
268. Id. at 502 (Brown, J. dissenting).
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Shulman: it would be hard to imagine another situation more
deserving of privacy protection than the treatment of an
accident victim receiving medical attention within the
supposed secured confines of an ambulance. 69  What
legitimate interest could the public truly have in seeing and
hearing the recently parapalegecized Mrs. Shulman crying
out in pain and expressing her desire to die?27° However, the
court's blind adherence to the logical relationship testjustified a ruling as a matter of law that no reasonable jury
could conclude that this intrusive and shameful media
coverage was not newsworthy."1
Privacy rights require greater protection than the logical
relevance test is capable of providing. If the plaintiff in
Shulman did not suffer an actionable invasion of privacy, it
would be hard to imagine a situation where someone else
would. Although the plurality approach did not expressly
destroy the public disclosure of private facts tort, it
eliminated much of the bite that it once had.272 As a result,
media abuses and ever-increasing penetrations into the
private sphere are likely to increase. Unless the ad hoc
balancing test is brought back, personal privacy rights will be
increasingly trammeled over in the name of free speech
rights.
This viewpoint was espoused by Justice Brown's dissent
in Shulman:
After paying lip service to this court's well-established,
scholarly precedents, the plurality proceeds to ignore their
test for assessing newsworthiness. Worse yet, the new
test adopted in the plurality opinion seriously
compromises personal privacy by rendering otherwise
private facts newsworthy whenever they bear a "logical
269. Id. at 475-76.
270. This view was echoed in Justice Brown's dissent where she stated:
[airguably, the last thing an injured accident victim should have to
worry about while being pried from her wrecked car is that a television
producer may be recording everything she says to medical personnel for
the possible edification and entertainment of casual television
viewers.... A jury could reasonably believe that fundamental respect
for human dignity requires the patients' [sic] anxious journey be taken
only with those whose care is solely for them and out of sight of the
prying eyes (or cameras) of others.
Id. at 503-04 (Brown, J. dissenting).
271. Id. at 488.
272. See supra Part II.B-E.
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relationship" to a matter of legitimate public concern, even
in situations where the news media obtains the private
273facts by deceptive and unlawful means.
According to Justice Brown, if the Court had applied an ad
hoc balancing approach, as stare decisis required, proper
consideration could have been given to the depth of the
publication's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, rather
than sacrificing individual privacy rights in favor of the
public's interest in road accidents." 4 Justice Brown concluded
by expressing her position that she saw "no reason to
abandon our traditional [ad hoc balancing] newsworthiness
test which has produced consistent and predictable results
over the course of nearly three decades. ,27
3. Because the Public Disclosure of Private Facts Tort Is
Especially Fact Specific, Summary Judgment
Should Seldom Be Granted
Although summary judgment had been used with
increasing frequency by California courts analyzing public
disclosure of private facts claims prior to Shulman,"6
virtually every case in this area of the law is likely to be
disposed of on summary judgment motions if courts follow the
plurality's approach. Whereas courts once used a balancing
approach to determine whether summary judgment should be
granted 7 courts following Shulman must grant summary
judgment if there is some minimal relationship between the
facts disclosed and the event giving rise to the publication.
The California Supreme Court stated: "[b]ecause
unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling
effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy
resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable.
Therefore summary judgment is a favored remedy [in such
cases] " The court added, "'[t]o any suggestion that the
outer bounds of liability should be left to a jury to decide we
273. Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 502 (Cal. 1998) (Brown,
J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 502-05.
275. Id. at 504.
276. See supra Part II.B-C.
277. See supra Part II.B-C.
278. Shulman, 455 P.2d at 484-86.
279. Id. at 487 (quoting Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 586 P.2d 672, (Cal. 1978)).
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reply that in cases involving the rights protected by the
speech and press clauses of the First Amendment the courts
insist on judicial control of the jury."'28 ° Thus, it appears that
very few privacy cases will even reach the jury if courts follow
the Shulman approach.
Although this comment acknowledges the importance of
protecting free speech rights, it argues that the First
Amendment should yield to the competing interest of privacy
rights in certain circumstances.' Sometimes, when
sufficiently important societal values are in conflict with free
speech, the government is allowed to regulate speech. 82 This
principle is best reflected by constitutional jurisprudence in
the area of obscenity law. '83 By analogy, the public interest in
protecting privacy rights is sufficiently great so as to justify
the subordination of intrusive speech that gives unwarranted
publicity to embarrassing details of people's private lives.
Asking juries to strike the proper balance between individual
privacy rights and free press is not inconsistent with the First
Amendment, as juries have long assessed obscenity
questions.284 If juries can be entrusted to evaluate obscenity
cases where criminal sanctions are involved,285 certainly juries
are capable of determining when disclosure of private facts
warrants the imposition of civil damages.
The public disclosure of private facts tort is premised on
assessing when the press has overstepped its bounds and
violated societal standards of decency. '86 California courts
have long held that a publication of private facts will not be
actionable unless it "would be offensive and objectionable to
the reasonable person and [would] not [be] of legitimate
public concern."28 ' Careful examination of the facts presented
280. Id. (quoting Haynes v. Knopf, 8 F.3d 1222, 1234 (7th Cir. 1993)).
281. See infra Part V.
282. See generally Central Hudson v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
283. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951).
284. See supra note 268.
285. See supra note 268.
286. See supra Part II.A.-E.
287. Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998)
(quoting Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (Cal. Ct. App.
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in each case and a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances is needed to make this determination. Thus,
juries who represent the conscience of the community are in
the best position to evaluate these matters. 2 8  A strong
judicial preference for summary judgment in public disclosure
of private facts cases prevents juries from sending a message
to media defendants that they are abusing the First
Amendment. If judges are encouraged to exonerate media
defendants in these cases, through the use of an overly-
deferential logical relationship test, media abuses will
continue to grow in both frequency and severity. The best
way to ensure that the media is not allowed to abuse privacy
rights is to allow the jury to decide these difficult cases.289
V. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes that courts return to the use of
an ad hoc balancing test in lieu of the bright line "logical
relationship test" advocated by the Shulman plurality.29 ° An
ad hoc balancing approach to the public disclosure of private
facts tort allows courts to strike a balance between the
competing rights of individual privacy and freedom of the
press.2 1  However, the Shulman approach fails to take
adequate account for individual privacy rights and is overly
deferential to the press.292 Thus, in order to harmonize the
important constitutional rights in these cases, courts should
consider the totality of the circumstances and give careful
scrutiny to the facts implicated in each case.
Courts should look closely at the following factors when
evaluating the newsworthiness of a publication. First, courts
should consider the subject matter giving rise to the
1983).
288. See generally Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
289. Although an argument could be made that citizens disgruntled with
current media tactics could try to pass a law limiting the press's ability to
publish private facts, such an option is not feasible. Media lobbyists wield a
great deal of leverage over Sacramento politics. Moreover, any attempt to pass
such a bill would be treated by the press as a witch-hunt. Every night the
media would play spin-doctor and publish editorials claiming that the First
Amendment was being dictatorially and unconstitutionally censored. Thus,
relying on legislation to be passed may not be a feasible option.
290. See supra Part II.E.
291. See supra Part II.A-E.
292. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
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publication. Does it relate to the operations of government or
the administration of government? If not, does the
publication pertain to an issue that is relevant to the exercise
of democratic rights or touch upon an issue of general societal
concern?
Second, courts should consider whether the plaintiff is a
public or private figure. To make this determination, courts
should look at the plaintiffs occupation, position in society,
and connection to a newsworthy event. True public figures
should not receive as great of protection as involuntary or
limited purpose public figures. Nonetheless, not all aspects of
a public figure's private life should be published with
impunity.
Third, courts should consider what facts were disclosed
about the individual. If the disclosed facts were of a highly
personal nature,"'3 courts should ask whether it was
necessary to disclose that information. For example, in the
Shulman case, was it really necessary for the broadcasters to
announce her name, show her face, and replay the statements
she made while in the ambulance? If the facts are not of an
extremely personal nature, then the necessity inquiry is not
as important.
Fourth, courts should consider whether the facts
disclosed contribute anything of value to society. If the facts
merely add shock appeal, then this should weigh in favor of
tort liability. However, if the facts truly contribute something
to society, the press should be allowed more leeway.
Finally, courts should consider the social policies
implicated in each case. Courts should ask the questions: 1)
would liability under these circumstances unduly restrain the
press and 2) would failure to impose liability discourage other
people from contributing their talents or skills to society for
fear that their lives would be exposed to the world?94 Thus,
293. One possible way to put some teeth back into the public disclosure tort,
while at the same time comporting with the First Amendment, would be to
place the burden of proof on the newsworthiness issue on media defendants
when their publications disclose arguably private facts about a plaintiff. This
way, the First Amendment can be used as a shield rather than a sword. When
the facts disclosed are less personally intrusive, the plaintiff should retain the
burden of proving that the publication was not newsworthy.
294. For example, would a woman think twice about rescuing a baby off the
train tracks, if the press would later run a story that she is a recovering drug
addict and a reformed prostitute? If so, then the press has overstepped its
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only after a careful and thorough balancing of all of these
factors should decisions regarding liability for public
disclosure of private facts be rendered.
This comment also proposes that summary judgment
should not be a preferred method of disposing of public
disclosure of private facts cases. Because liability is based
upon a finding that a publication is not newsworthy and
highly offensive to a reasonable person, juries should decide
these cases.295 The jury, as the voice of the community is in
the best position to reflect changing societal values.296
Allowing judges to rule as a matter of law prevents the people
from sending a message to overzealous journalists.29 '
VI. CONCLUSION
The public disclosure of private facts tort forces courts to
strike a difficult balance between the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of the press and the interest of the
states in protecting the privacy of individuals.299 Courts have
generally given broad protection to media defendants under
the First Amendment to the detriment of individual privacy
rights.299 This comment traced the evolution of the judicial
treatment of this issue in California and revealed that there
is a movement away from ad hoc balancing toward a bright
bounds. What is newsworthy is that this woman rescued a baby, not that she
has had personal problems in her life.
295. In both Briscoe and Diaz the courts held that the jury was the proper
finder of fact in the area of public disclosure of private facts because they were
in the best position to evaluate the legality of the publications.
296. The majority of jurisdictions consider newsworthiness a question of fact
to be decided by the jury. See, e.g., Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr.
762, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). A privacy plaintiff faces a real challenge in trying
to win a public disclosure tort case because of the "broad treatment that most
courts give the First Amendment defense. This allows defendants to prevail
easily on summary judgment motions, and therefore to escape jury scrutiny."
Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First
Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L. REV.
185, 197 (1979).
297. Obviously much is at stake when First Amendment rights are involved
and there are concerns that juries will punish the expression of unpopular ideas
through the imposition of tort liability. However, this argument
underestimates the ability of jurors to follow the judge's instruction and ignores
the fact that there are remedial devices such as judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, motions for a new trial, and appeals that can prevent an overzealous
jury from erroneously abusing the First Amendment.
298. See supra Part II.A-E.
299. See supra Part II.B-E.
1999] 1265
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
line test."°° In addition, this comment demonstrated that
judges have frequently resolved these cases as matter of
law.
301
Courts should not abandon their ad hoc balancing
approaches in favor of bright line tests. The use of an ad hoc
balancing test to determine the newsworthiness of a
publication is essential in order to strike the proper balance
between these competing constitutional rights.0 2  This
comment proposed a set of factors for consideration when
determining whether a publication is truly newsworthy or
not.03  It also proposed that summary should not be a
preferred procedure in these cases because this is an
especially fact specific area of the law that requires juries to
evaluate publications in light of contemporary community
values.04 Such an approach would not unconstitutionally
chill free speech, but would instead allow the community to
determine for itself when a publication has impermissibly
invaded the private sphere.05
Given the expanding technology of the day, and the
growing morbid and sensational appetite of the press, we as
individuals need greater protection from an irresponsible
press that often publishes with a callous disregard for the
rights of individuals. The legal community must prepare to
meet the demands of an evolving society. Change is needed
in this area of the law as overly broad interpretations of the
First Amendment should no longer be relied upon as
justification for the diminution of individual privacy rights.
Peter Gielniak
300. See supra Part II.B-E.
301. See supra Part II.B-E.
302. See supra Part V.
303. See supra Part V.
304. See supra Part V.
305. See supra Part V.
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